EDITORIAL

A New Era in West Asia
The Erosion of Hegemony and the Rise of Regional Agency

he international landscape that emerged from the US-Israeli attack on Iran has become one of the most important indicators of the profound transformation in the balance of power, not only in West Asia but across the world. The aim of the attack was to prevent Iran from remaining a regional power, re-establish US-Israeli superiority, and bring West Asia back under the security framework defined by Washington. Yet the outcome was the opposite. The direct intervention of the United States demonstrated that its military superiority alone was insufficient to determine regional outcomes. Israel’s aggression, rather than uniting the countries of the region along the US-Israeli line, strengthened the tendency of these countries to determine their own security and future themselves.
These developments are manifestations in West Asia of the major shift in the balance of power in the world. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the weakening of its influence in Iraq, the failure of its attempt to partition Syria, and the failure of Israel’s plans for regional hegemony are all part of the same process.
At the foundation of this transformation lies a profound change in the world economy. The centers of production and accumulation in the world economy are shifting; the relative superiority of the capitalist centers over the world economy is eroding; and, as a political consequence, the old hierarchical structure of the imperialist system is being shaken. The struggle of the imperialist centers to preserve their superiority in the world economy is deepening their contradictions with the developing world while also sharpening competition among themselves.
One consequence of this is the differentiation within the Atlantic camp in its approach to the developing world. Differences of interest between the United States and Britain, Germany, and France are deepening. Countries occupying lower positions within the Atlantic system are also able to develop positions that differ from Washington’s line. While the necessity for the imperialist centers to act jointly against the developing world is becoming increasingly pressing, competition among them is pulling them away from a common position and deepening their contradictions.
The developing world states, despite the competition and differences of interest among them, are increasingly coming together under these conditions in the areas of common development, security, and cooperation, despite having different political systems and on the basis of sovereign equality.
These conditions are enabling the countries of West Asia to develop more independent choices regarding their own security and regional relations. Saudi Arabia’s development of strategic relations with China while maintaining its relations with the United States, and its preservation of normalization with Iran; Turkey’s development of security cooperation with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, while at the same time deepening its relations with China and Russia, demonstrate the efforts of the countries of the region to free themselves from the imperialist centers. What is at issue here is not the replacement of one external power by another, but the ability of states with different systems to establish areas of common interest concerning their own security and development on the basis of sovereign equality.
A new order has not yet been fully established in West Asia. The military and economic power of the United States remains significant, and differences of interest among the countries of the region persist. Yet the old order no longer functions as it once did. The shift in the balance of power in the world is creating the objective conditions for nation-states to strengthen their independence against imperialist hegemonism. The countries of West Asia are also demonstrating greater agency in determining their own security and future. The Mecca Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, is a concrete expression of this agency.

 

FİKRET AKFIRAT
Editor-in-Chief

Contents

Abstract

This research examines Saudi Arabia’s strategic use of cultural instruments as a sophisticated form of hedging amid intensifying U.S.-China great-power rivalry and the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Drawing on hedging theory, the study conceptualizes “complex cultural hedging” as a deliberate, state-orchestrated strategy that simultaneously cultivates and balances American and Chinese soft power influences without aligning with either. Four core objectives drive Saudi cultural hedging: responding to China’s rise and the rise of multipolarity; forging long-term cultural and strategic ties with Beijing; reducing the historical dominance of U.S. cultural influence; and preserving Saudi national identity and Islamic values through selective adaptation. The analysis operationalizes this strategy across six dimensions: language and education; cultural institutions and food diplomacy; media visibility; air connectivity and mobility; scientific and cultural cooperation; and emerging digital sectors, including gaming, e-sports, animation, and sports diplomacy. Empirical findings from 2020–2026 reveal five key characteristics of the hedging strategy: multi-dimensional, complementary, dual, dynamic, and asymmetric. Riyadh sustains deep, elite-level ties with the United States while accelerating volume and mass exposure with China, thereby maximizing autonomy and projecting a distinctive, soft, middle-power culture rooted in moderated Islamic values. The study concludes that cultural hedging represents a low-risk, but high-legitimacy, extension of traditional hedging, transforming great-power cultural competition into a strategic asset for middle powers navigating multipolarity.
 

Abstract

This article examines Türkiye-China diplomatic relations on the 55th anniversary of their establishment through the lenses of power transition, geoeconomic connectivity, and economic interdependence. Its central question is whether Türkiye remains primarily a transit country within Eurasian production and logistics networks integrated with China, or whether it has made measurable progress toward becoming a joint production hub. The study is based on a structured qualitative document analysis covering 1971-2026. Official policy documents, Türkiye’s foreign trade data, World Bank corridor reports, investment announcements, and peer-reviewed studies are compared using indicators of logistics capacity, the technological composition of trade, foreign direct investment, local value added, and technology transfer. The findings show that Türkiye’s logistical position has strengthened, but its production-hub function has not become institutionalized. In 2023, Türkiye exported USD 3.3 billion to China, imported USD 44.98 billion, and recorded a trade deficit of USD 41.7 billion. Chinese foreign direct investment stock was approximately USD 9 billion, further demonstrating the persistence of trade asymmetry. The World Bank projects that Middle Corridor freight volume could reach 11 million tonnes by 2030 if the necessary measures are implemented. The article operationalizes the distinction between a transit country and a joint production hub through measurable indicators and links connectivity’s stabilizing effects to balanced interdependence, institutionalization, and positive expectations about future cooperation. Türkiye currently occupies an intermediate position dominated by its transit function; transformation depends on investments that generate local sourcing, joint R&D, technology transfer, and exports to third-country markets.
 

Abstract

The Digital Silk Road (DSR), a key component of China's Belt and Road Initiative, offers partner countries strategic opportunities in telecommunications, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, e-commerce, and smart cities. This paper examines China-Arab cooperation under the DSR framework through a case study of Jordan, located at the crossroads of the Levant, the Gulf, and North Africa. Drawing on literature analysis, official reports, the study finds that Chinese companies, particularly Huawei and ZTE, have played a significant role in upgrading Jordan's digital infrastructure, expanding network coverage, and cultivating local talent through ICT training programs. The cooperation also faces challenges, including data security concerns, regulatory misalignment, skills shortages, and geopolitical pressures. The paper argues that, with improved digital governance, stronger legal frameworks, and strategic investment, the DSR can accelerate Jordan's digital transformation, enhance its economic resilience, and reinforce its position as a regional digital hub, thus fostering sustainable and mutually beneficial China-Arab cooperation.
 

Abstract

The period after October 7, 2023, has opened a striking gap between transatlantic public opinion and the strategic calculations of Western and Gulf Arab governments. Polling across the United States and Western Europe records historic lows in support for Israel and unprecedented sympathy for Palestinians, alongside a wave of state recognitions that brought the total to 157 of 193 UN member states by September 2025. However, this rhetorical apotheosis of “Palestinianism” has coincided with - and arguably accelerated - the material extinction of any plausible path to Palestinian statehood. Drawing on recent polling and strategic analyses of the June 2025 Twelve-Day War and the degradation of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” and engaging sympathetically with the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, this article argues that strategic convergence among Washington, Jerusalem, and the Gulf monarchies operates on a different plane from public sentiment. Record settlement expansion, Palestinian Authority delegitimation, the destruction of Hamas, the decapitation of Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime, and strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities point toward an emerging Israeli regional hegemony underwritten by quiet Gulf-Israeli security cooperation. Transatlantic Palestinianism thus functions less as a political program than as a performative identity practice, decoupled from Arab state interests. Peak rhetorical embrace coincides with material impossibility.
 

Abstract

This study examines Mao Zedong’s understanding of dialectics and its political implications. It evaluates Mao’s thought through three principal dimensions: his critique of economic determinism and bureaucratic-technocratic socialism, his emphasis on the constitutive role of the masses in political struggle, and his engagement with China’s traditional intellectual heritage. Mao’s dialectical approach is examined comparatively in relation to Stalin’s interpretation of historical materialism. The findings show that Mao’s understanding of dialectics departs significantly from the classical Soviet approach centered on the economic base by emphasizing the role of culture, ideology, political struggle, and mass mobilization in social transformation. This perspective underpins his concept of the mass line, according to which socialism depends not only on the development of the productive forces but also on the active political participation of the masses. The study further argues that Mao’s dialectical thought emerged through the interaction of the Chinese intellectual tradition and Marxist theory, while his effort to accelerate revolutionary transformation through social contradictions generated a tension between traditional Chinese dialectics and the modern revolutionary-progressivist worldview. Consequently, Mao Zedong Thought offers an original theoretical framework for understanding economic determinism, the political subject, and social transformation.
 

Abstract

Strange, A. M. (2024). Chinese Global Infrastructure. (Elements in Global China). Cambridge University Press.